Energy infrastructure attacks rise - but most fail or fizzle
Two cyberattacks on electrical grids this month tell different stories about operational technology security.
Poland's distribution network rebuffed what appears to be a Russian-linked infiltration attempt - same tools and methods used against Ukrainian systems for a decade. Venezuela's grid went dark during the US extraction of President Maduro on January 3, part of what President Trump called "a certain expertise we have."
The difference: Poland has modern infrastructure and security practices. Venezuela has neither. When you can't keep the lights on normally, you can't keep attackers out.
The real numbers
Ransomware hit 67% of energy and utilities organizations in 2024, with average recovery costs of $3.12M. Utility-sector ransomware is up 80% year-over-year. State-sponsored attacks increased 150%.
But frequency isn't impact. Most attacks cause brief disruptions, not lasting damage. The democratization of attack tools - Shodan, open-source frameworks, MITRE ATT&CK - means more actors can probe infrastructure. Detection and response have improved alongside attack volume.
What CTOs should watch
The security gaps are documented: 79% of attackers target backups, nearly 50% exploit unpatched vulnerabilities in oil and gas. Network audits find undocumented external connections, insecure services like NetBIOS, VLAN mismatches, and time synchronization errors.
These aren't zero-day problems. They're operational technology hygiene failures.
Zero trust architecture is gaining traction in OT environments, though implementation remains challenging. Network segmentation and air-gapping work when properly maintained - Poland's defense likely included both. The DoD's DTM 25-003 guidance on zero trust for operational technology reflects growing recognition that perimeter security alone doesn't scale.
The geopolitical angle
By 2026, analysts expect over 33% of global energy and utilities will experience cyber pre-positioning by nation-state actors. Russia's Polish attempt fits a pattern of low-coordination harassment. The Venezuela operation shows what coordinated cyber and physical action can achieve - but also why it's rarely used. Salt Typhoon's exposure in US communications infrastructure demonstrates the risk of revealing capabilities too early.
Infrastructure attacks work best as force multipliers in active operations, not standalone political leverage. History suggests this pattern will hold.
What this means in practice
For energy-sector technology leaders: The threat is real, the tools are available to attackers, and the basics still matter most. Patch management, network visibility, backup security, and documented asset management prevent more attacks than advanced threat hunting.
The attack surface is growing. So is the defender's playbook.